You were completely wrong about your example. You conflated agreement about the correctness of the theory itself with agreement about further interpretation.
That’s not what “objective” means, and I have no idea what you mean by the “mechanics of the theory.” What are the “mechanics” of the prion theory?
Empirical and subjective are not synonymous with mechanical and interpretational, respectively.
If it seems evident that there is a difference, why did you conflate them?
I don’t.
That makes no sense. We test theories. We try to falsify them, not to verify them. And if it isn’t empirically testable, it isn’t even a scientific hypothesis, so it can never be a theory.
That makes no sense either.
No. Would you infer that?
False. It wasn’t that you simply weren’t clear, it was that you were simply wrong.
No.
I don’t agree with any of that.
Regardless, I would disagree with your use of that creationist trope.
IBE does not equal hypothesis testing, so your response makes no sense.
IBE is not hypothesis testing, so you are not addressing my question.
Before we go any further, I just want to say thanks for your continued engagement in the discussion. I enjoy these kind of dialogues because, among other things, they motivate me to think more deeply about things.
Not necessarily. It depends on how the term theory is understood. It seems, as in your case, it can be understood as interpretation not being considered part of it. But the following definition of a theory seems to suggest a different understanding.
The paleontologistStephen Jay Gould wrote that "…facts and theories are different things, not rungs in a hierarchy of increasing certainty. Facts are the world’s data. Theories are structures of ideas that explain and interpret facts. [emphasis added]
So it’s not clear to me that the interpretation isn’t part of what is defined as a theory. Seems it could be argued either way. And if understood as including interpretation as I was using it, the supposed discrepancy dissolves. Regardless, I’m happy to go with your definition, in which case, I believe that would settle that issue, wouldn’t it?
Or maybe I’m not correctly understanding what you meant to say by that comment. If instead, you mean that my mistake was claiming that the correctness of the mechanics of the theory was not settled because the interpretation hadn’t been settled, I think that if the statements I made were looked at carefully, it would be obvious enough that was not my intention.
So what does it mean then?
In the science of biology, a mechanism is a system of causally interacting parts and processes that produce one or more effects. Scientists explain phenomena by describing mechanisms that could produce the phenomena.
So as far as I can tell, in a theory the mechanism is what “explains” a phenomenon. And since you’re the biologist, I’ll let you expound on the mechanism of the prion theory, but I would assume it has something to do with the way the prion folds.
Empirical is not synonymous with mechanical; agreed. But unless it’s the only option, like in the case of something like gravity, as far as I can tell, an interpretation is an internal reasoning process which would make it, by my definition, for the most part subjective.
It may be interpreting objective facts, but how it translate them into what the world is like in light of those facts is not an objective process by my definition. The exception, as I just mentioned above, would be if it’s a deductive inference.
As per my explanation above, I wasn’t necessarily conflating them. But had I been more specific and said “the interpretation” of the theory in the first place, as I did afterwards, it possibly would have avoided the misunderstanding.
However, as I’ve said already, it seems there is an obvious difference between the objective mechanism and the subjective interpretation in QM. That’s the point I wanted to call attention to.
OK. I’m fine with that.
Not sure exactly how your response applies to my comment, but just because an hypothesis is empirically testable doesn’t mean it’s objective. There can be a past event that happened only once, and/or has no corresponding event in its entirety in the present, for which an hypothesis is proposed to explain the event.
From that explanation a prediction can be made that is empirically testable and can result in positive empirical data. But when the event itself cannot be externally examined because of the nature of the event, or the proposed mechanism cannot be studied in a corresponding event in a fashion that involves the mechanism in it’s entirety, there’s no way to empirically verify it.
So the claim of how the event occurred would be subjective because there’s no way to directly observe if it is consistent with the actual unfolding of the event. All that can be done is subjectively infer from the limited external evidence available that the explanation in question best explains the event.
I think it does. But I would need to know your reasons for saying so in order to understand why you think otherwise.
From the way I understood the statement it seemed a possibility, but didn’t seem likely. Just wanted to make sure.
As I’ve mentioned earlier above, I don’t think that’s necessarily the case. But maybe we can move on from this issue as it seems to me we’ve run it sufficiently into the ground, and I don’t see any need to discuss it any further.
And if you want to insist on saying that I was wrong, I don’t mind at all, as long as you understand the point I meant to make, that the mechanics of QM are objectively verified, while at the same time all of the proposed interpretations remain subjective.
How about now?
You don’t agree that the mechanism of an hypothesis needs to be empirically verifiable to be objective? Why not?
Whatever you choose to identify it with, how many common examples to the contrary can you point to to show that what I’m saying is wrong?
Oh, it sure seems like IBE. Isn’t it about comparing one hypothesis with another? If it’s not IBE or at least similar to it, I guess I need some clarification as to what exactly it is. And maybe you could clarify what connection your question has with the comment it refers to that I made:
And it doesn’t seem like scientific predictions in the strict sense of predicting a future event would be possible in such a case.
I must confess I’m a bit lost as to where you’re going with this. If you got the impression that I was saying testing hypothesis are useless for past events, that’s not at all what I meant to say.
I’m simply saying that in general for past events of the type I’m referring to there is usually no way of establishing objectivity of the mechanisms because of a lack of empirical accessibility to the events and/or the mechanisms explaining them.
You’re welcome, but I’m seeing only a reflexive need to attack science, not any deep thinking.
Who might understand the term more clearly? Someone quoting Wikipedia or someone who has been a working scientist for >40 years?
Many things are not clear to you. You are eliding these problems because you are attacking science because you don’t like evolution.
There are no mechanics of any theory. Hypotheses need to be mechanistic. That doesn’t mean that they have mechanics.
No.
When you evade real-life examples in this way, you do not appear to be sincere.
None of that supports the idea that they are synonymous.
I don’t think there’s anything one could call an “objective mechanism” in QM. Once again, your avoidance of actual examples suggests an unwillingness to gain a deeper understanding.
So going to the real-life example that you avoid, there’s no way to empirically verify that a person committed a murder, because the murder happened in the past.
Jim, you’re just groping for excuses to reject science itself.
I already offered them and you chose to run to the safety of false equivocations.
Oh, no, it doesn’t.
No, it’s about testing hypotheses. Having two hypotheses make different predictions for the same experiment/observation is a wonderful thing, but it isn’t the norm.
This is where you are completely lost. It seems that you prefer to remain in that state.
Oh, if that’s the case I’m totally unaware of it. But honestly I don’t think so. And assuming such may explain what seems to me to be somewhat of the same to some of my comments.
I can agree that you would be in a much better position. That is why I only suggested that, from how it was defined by other scientists, it might be possible that there were alternative ways to understand it. But I wasn’t insisting on it.
How about, when there is one, the mechanism associated with the phenomenon that the hypothesis/theory is explaining? Isn’t a mechanism, when available, usually a part of formulating an hypothesis?
OK. How about the phenomenon that the hypothesis/theory explains has an associated mechanism that demonstrates the causal workings of the phenomenon?
You brought the examples up, not me. But you haven’t given any explanation as to why. Instead, it seems you want me to do so. I find that a bit puzzling.
Why not? If interpretation is always subjective, which the more I think about it seems to be the case, why wouldn’t it be closely associated with subjectivity?
Why not? The quantum mechanism has been empirically verified in every test so far. Sounds like it’s objective, i.e., a confirmed truth about external reality, to me.
Funny enough, that’s in a way exactly what I’m saying. For that very reason, the standard of certainty set for jurors is “beyond a reasonable doubt”.
As I understand it a guilty declaration from a jury is justified as long as there is sufficient evidence, either indirect circumstantial evidence, and/or direct eye witness testimony that points to the person’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
But the jury’s judgment is subjective, because except for those who actually witnessed the crime when it happened, direct empirical verification is not possible since the actual crime is in the past, and, therefore, no longer empirically accessible.
The degree of certainty of the verdict is based on how strong the evidence is. There are cases that are pretty near certain, and others that are borderline. But regardless, none will ever be as certain as something that is presently empirically verifiable, and is, therefore, considered to be an objective fact.
Maybe they were offered, but there were no reasons given as for why they were offered, or how they were applicable to the discussion, at least not that I’m aware of.
I’m afraid I’m not following you at all on this one.
One phrase that has helped me understand the difference between hypothesis and empirical testing is, “you don’t observe the hypothesis”. They hypothesis or theory is necessarily unseen. If it can be observed it is an observation, not a theory or hypothesis. What we are trying to do is build a model of what we can’t directly observe, and we do that by using what we can observe.
Stephen Jay Gould did a really good job of explaining how theories and observations (i.e. facts) work together.
If you are putting your hypothesis at risk by being tested through objective data, then your conclusions are objective, not subjective. When testing of a theory depends on your subjective opinion instead of objective observations, then the theory is subjective. The important part is the separation between the observation and the person creating the explanation. This is the power of science. What it does is make reality the arbiter of which theories are supported or falsified.
The best way to understand it would be to engage with real-life cases that do not threaten your religious beliefs. You clearly are unwilling to do that; quoting from Wikipedia does not constitute intellectual engagement.
There’s no “when available.” If there’s no mechanism being hypothesized, there’s no hypothesis. There are no “mechanics of a theory.” You’re missing the point completely.
No. The hypothesis (you really need to drop “theory” completely, because you don’t grasp its meaning) is mechanistIC, in that a hypothesized mechanism (not necessarily real) makes clear, objective predictions about future observations. If the predictions aren’t objective, the mechanism isn’t being sufficiently specified.
Quoting from Wikipedia does not constitute intellectual engagement.
Because by requiring hypotheses to be mechanistic, we remove virtually all of the subjectivity. We’re avoiding cheating by putting any interpretation in before we get the data.
That’s why pretending that science is merely retrospective is so dishonest and is a staple of pseudoscientific (i.e., creationist) propaganda.
Because they aren’t the same thing.
You’re conflating the threshold with what we know in typical cases of guilt.
Baloney. Eyewitness testimony is incredibly subjective and unreliable.
Your pathological avoidance of them is inhibiting your understanding.
OK. I can reply to the previous comments later if needed, but I think things are getting a little off track from where I’m wanting to go. So before I go any further it seems like I need to further clarify what I mean by objective and subjective.
First of all I’m assuming that there is a mind independent reality that would exist regardless of whether or not it’s being perceived by a subject. And I’m not concerned with ontology, but rather epistemology.
So in regards to science I’m using the term objective in an epistemological sense to refer to knowledge of subject independent reality through observation primarily, but also, though in a more limited way, through detection.
Subjective would be any knowledge that falls outside of that definition. And by that understanding, knowing something objectively would be in the highest range of certainty possible for scientific claims.
Whereas knowing something subjectively would have different levels of certainty, depending on how well it’s supported by indirect empirical evidence, and barring deductive inferences, may approach but never reach the same level of certainty as objective knowledge. So what I’m arguing really boils down to this.
As I’m using the terms objective and subjective, if what a scientific hypothesis is explaining is real time empirically accessible, like a regularity or a repeatable pattern of nature, then it can be directly examined repeatedly in real time to empirically confirm, or not, if the explanation matches with the subject independent reality of what it’s explaining.
If what the scientific hypothesis is explaining is not presently empirically accessible, like events outside of recorded history, or events that are out of reach of complete real time empirical access, the explanation can only be inferred through empirical evidence that indirectly supports it and would fall outside of what I’m referring to as objective knowledge, unless it can be inferred deductively from the evidence.
So if the way I’m using the terms is viable, and my reasoning is valid, this seems to me to be a reasonable approach in general to distinguish between objective and subjective knowledge in science and would be a general framework to help provide additional clarity as to what degree of certainty might be appropriate to ascribed to a particular scientific claim.
OK. I see what you’re saying here. Explanation (theory) is not something that is observable, because it is a thought process, in essence an idea, and therefore by nature internal, i.e., subjective. I think the confusion comes when what the theory is explaining has been empirically verified, e.g., regularities in motion of matter, and through association the explanation is thought to be objective. But that isn’t the case as far as I can tell.
As I understand it, Einstein’s explanation of gravity as a space time continuum and Newton’s explanation of gravity as a force both work as explanations. And even though consensus has accepted Einstein’s explanation over Newton’s, very probably due to it’s association with Einstein’s successful correctional adjustments, my understanding is that there are renowned scientists even today that, while accepting the corrections, argue for Newton’s explanation over Einstein’s, which illustrates the subjectivity of explanation.
And interpretation, which is akin to explanation, when it comes to QT, provides an even better illustration. So even though what a theory is explaining can be empirically confirmed, the explanation itself, unless deductively inferred, remains subjective knowledge due to it’s being in essence an idea that itself can never be empirically accessed, and therefor itself, is empirically unverifiable.
I agree that testing a hypothesis is an objective exercise, otherwise it’s not a real test, just an opinion. However, I don’t think the explanation becomes objective because a prediction it makes is empirically confirmed.
No matter how many tests it passes based on it’s predictive power, unless deductively confirmed, the explanation ultimately has to be subjected to all the recognized criteria of IBE and then subjectively judged as to whether or not it is the best explanation overall. Ultimately the judgment is determined based on all the criteria, not just predictive power alone.
Where you’re clearly wanting to go is a conclusion that evolutionary biology isn’t good science.
That’s not what it means.
That’s not how science works. You’re completely dodging the powerful part of it–testing predictions.
That’s not how science works. You’re completely dodging the powerful part of it–testing predictions.
If the way you’re using those terms is viable, then you have to conclude that astronomy is subjective and weak, and I expect you to be ranting about this weakness to groups of people preparing to travel to watch a predicted solar eclipse.
But you’re really just out to get evolution.
Perhaps you missed this, but the power of science is that all conclusions are tentative. You keep pretending that I haven’t patiently explained to you that hypothesis testing is iterative, not the one-off process you are talking about. That means that conclusions become MORE objective with each iteration.
No. That isn’t correct. However, I’m wondering how is this relevant to addressing the claim I’m making?
That’s how I’m narrowly defining it for the purposes of this discussion. If you object, please let me know why.
I’m not raising an issue about how the scientific method works. I’m simply discussing possible ways to clarify degrees of scientific certainty for the benefit of lay audiences. And I have tried previously to address the issues you’ve raised about predictions. So if you think I failed to address it adequately I’d be happy to address it further. Please point me to the comment you made where I failed to give an adequate response, or let me know what you still have issues with.
By my definition whatever is empirically confirmed is objective. Whatever isn’t, for the most part, is subjective, and depending on supporting evidence would have different levels of certainty.
My understanding is that eclipses are predicted through calculations based on empirically confirmed laws, and have been successfully demonstrated in repeated tests. That would be a case of objectivity in astronomy. But from that, it wouldn’t follow that anything that has to do with astronomy is objective.
If we’re talking about objective as I’ve defined it, and about iteration with positive results, I would express it as less subjective, or closer to being objective. But in principle I don’t think I have ever suggested iteration wouldn’t contribute one way or another in any particular case to its level of certainty.
Bear in mind I’m talking in terms of epistemology, i.e., what can be said to be known about something. With ontology it would be whether or not something actually exists. So something could be said to objectively exist based on subjective knowledge that is reasonably established.
When a theory comports with objective facts, then the theory is objective.
Then there is no such thing as objective because I can always find someone who will disagree with a well established and observed fact. This is the problem with the argument you seem to be making. In an attempt to make science look as subjective as anything else you have to destroy any chance of objectivity existing.
The reason Einstein’s theory is accepted is because it has passed empirical testing. The detection of gravitational waves at the LIGO detectors is the most recent example.
It seems that you reject all of science as being capable of finding objective conclusions. Is this correct?
Fact: In science, an observation that has been repeatedly confirmed and for all practical purposes is accepted as “true.”
Hypothesis: A tentative statement about the natural world leading to deductions that can be tested. If the deductions are verified, the hypothesis is provisionally corroborated. If the deductions are incorrect, the original hypothesis is proved false and must be abandoned or modified. Hypotheses can be used to build more complex inferences and explanations.
Prediction: A rigorous, often quantitative, statement, forecasting what would happen under specific conditions.
Mechanism: A mechanism for a phenomenon consists of entities (or parts) whose activities and interactions are organized in such a way that they produce the phenomenon.
Law: A descriptive generalization about how some aspect of the natural world behaves under stated circumstances.
Theory: In science, a well-substantiated explanation of some aspect of the natural world that can incorporate facts, mechanisms, laws, inferences, and tested hypotheses.
Are you talking about a deductive inference? As I understand it, a theory is basically an idea offered as an explanation about scientific facts, mechanisms, and laws regarding some phenomenon.
And even though if what it’s about may be empirically verified, since “aboutness” isn’t empirically verifiable, other than the explanation being a deduction, i.e., logically necessary, I don’t see how it is justifiable to call a theory objective in an epistemological sense since there’s no way for the theory itself to be empirically verified.
Not sure I follow your reasoning. I’m saying that whatever can be empirically verified, or deduced by logic, is objective. Scientific facts being empirically verified are, therefor, objective. Descriptive elements of science like laws, mechanisms, and formulas, when empirically verified are, therefor, objective.
And any deductive inferences in science are logically verified and, therefor, objective. Just because theories are, for the most part, inferences to the best explanation and, therefor, subjective, why would that entail destroying any chance of objectivity in science?
If I’m not mistaken, this could also be explained by Newton’s idea of gravity as a force as well. So unless it’s a deduction, which it doesn’t appear to be, although arguably the best explanation, it would still be subjective with a certainty level possibly approaching objectivity, but not on the same level as objectivity.
Conclusions can be objective when they are arrived at through deductive reasoning because they follow necessarily. Otherwise, any other type of inference would be subjective as far as my knowledge of logic goes.
The real advantage science has over other disciplines is where what’s being studied can be subject to repeated real time empirical confirmation. And as I pointed out above, there are many elements of science that can be said to be objective. But just because there are objective elements associated with what are subjective elements of science doesn’t transform them into objective elements.
To be epsitemologically objective, narrowly defined, they would need to be deduced, or empirically verified. Otherwise, as far as I can tell, they are subjective regardless of any amount of objectivity that surrounds them.
Those sound good to me. The only thing that made me pause is the use of “deduction” in the definition of hypothesis. I suspect that “infer” might be a better term to use, and hopefully someone with more knowledge than I in the field of philosophy can enlighten us.
I am talking about objectivity. Objectivity is based on facts while subjectivity is based on human emotion. We can objectively determine if a blood sample at a crime scene matches the defendant, and we can subjectively determine if a person looks guilty, as one example.
The important part is the use of facts, as you describe above. When a conclusion depends on observable and verifiable facts then it no longer depends on the phrase “because I say so”.
Theories are empirically verified all of the time. That’s what scientific experiments are for.
You seem to be contradicting yourself, as shown here:
We can empirically verify theories. For example, General Relativity has been empirically verified many times over, most recently by the observation of gravitational waves at the LIGO detectors. Evolution and common ancestry have been empirically verified by fossils and genetics.
As I understand it, the way it’s tested is through a deductive inference. So maybe that’s what’s meant by, leads to a deduction.
This is probably one place that needs to be clarified. The way you’re using objective and subjective is not the same as the way I’m using it. Objectivity defined in a narrow epistemological sense as I’m using it is something that’s been reliably verified in an objective way, i.e., empirically, or logically through deductive inference.
Subjective epistemology narrowly defined as I’m using it is not about human emotions, but about human reasoning that has not been or maybe never can be deductively inferred, or has not been or maybe never can be empirically investigated.
As I mentioned before, theory is about explanation. Obviously it’s not possible to put an explanation in a test tube and empirically verify it. It’s an abstraction that can only be verified by logic. It’s what the explanation is about that can at times be empirically verifiable, not the explanation itself.
Again, the explanation may fit the data, but it’s the data that’s empirically verified, not the explanation. Explanation is not a material object that can be empirically verified. The only way to objectively verify an explanation is through logic. And that’s possible only when it can be shown to be a deductive inference.
That’s what I mean by “based on facts”. In contrast, subjectivity is based on human emotion.
Then what is the reasoning in a subjective epistemology based on?
Yes, it is possible. It’s done all of the time in labs across the world.
If this is your main argument, then even facts can’t be empirically verified because facts are also explanations and descriptions. How do you put a description in a test tube?
How is logic not applied in the scientific method?
Any type of inference that isn’t deductive, like induction or abduction. If I’m not mistaken, only a truly deductive inference can be considered objective because of the fact that its conclusion would follow necessarily.
Other types rely on reasoning that doesn’t necessarily follow, but are judgment calls made by individuals based on their particular assumptions, beliefs, and background knowledge.
Now induction could arguably be said to be objective when all the evidence points to one conclusion, but I haven’t really looked to deeply into that.
Again, the theory isn’t “put in a test tube.” What it’s about is “put in a test tube” when that option is available. When it’s not available, i.e., what the theory is about is something inferred from supporting evidence and therefor isn’t even empirically accessible, then there’s also a possibility that what it’s about may be just an abstract idea that isn’t even a part of actual reality.
I think what you’re referring to is probably more along the lines of reporting of facts. I gather a report of a scientific fact is usually a description of a verified scientific observation of some material reality, e.g., water is composed of 2 parts hydrogen and one part oxygen. The report is not the fact itself.
Verifying the observation would be to work with what was actually observed in the report. Nothing is being inferred, and the report only serves as a reference to the content of what was observed.
Maybe I’m not expressing myself clearly enough. I’m not saying that logic is not applied in the scientific method. If the logic used is a deductive inference, it would be objective. If any other type of logical inference, it would be subjective with varying levels of certainty.
I believe an inductive inference where all the evidence leads to one conclusion would be as close to objective as possible without actually being objective. Although I could see how that could arguably cross over into objectivity at least on a tentative basis.
This is probably the closest to my definition, although not quite the same. My definition of subjective would be more specifically stated to include any inferences that are not deductive in nature. I’m also not so much interested in whether the claim itself can be shown true or false as I am about whether it has been shown to be either. Another thing worth pointing out is that, whereas the article seems to be more generally about both ontological and epistemological objectivity/subjectivity, I’m focused specifically on epistemology.
Another is I’m specifically referring to empirical or deductive confirmation as what would be considered criteria for determining truth objectively. It may be they have other methods in mind, e.g., a rigorous inductive inference. And lastly, the purpose behind what I’m doing is to come up with a way to provide clarity in discussions that distinguishes between what generally would or wouldn’t be considered incontrovertible by laypersons.
So far the most unambiguous and straightforward way I’ve been able to come up with is narrowly defining objective knowledge as something that can be or has been empirically verified in a reliable manner through multiple independent sources, or has been proven true through valid and sound deductive inference. And subjective knowledge would be anything that falls outside of those parameters. If there’s a better way to go about it I’d be very interested to hear about it.
That doesn’t apply to the empirical predictions of a mechanistic, scientific hypothesis.
Looking deeply would help you to understand evolutionary biology.
You’re repeatedly changing the agreed-upon meaning of words to help you in your quest to rhetorically demolish evolutionary biology, while studiously avoiding the mountains of objective evidence that are consistent with it.
