I’m still not clear where you’re coming from. So what do you make of the following? Putative examples of this phenomenon are the caloric theory of heat and nineteenth century optical theories (Psillos 1999: Ch. 6), both of which were ultimately rejected as false but which had components that were retained in subsequent theories; these were the portions that were responsible for their novel confirmations.
And what about this? "… cases of theoretical claims that were subsequently determined to be entirely false but which managed nonetheless to generate impressive records of novel predictions. These include certain key claims made by Johannes Kepler in his Mysterium Cosmographicum (1596), assumptions used by Adams and Leverrier in the prediction of the planet Neptune’s existence and location (Lyons 2006), and Ptolemaic astronomy (Carman & Díez 2015).”
Are you denying these as examples of the mediocrity of novel predictions? If so, in light of these examples which seem to indicate inconsistency in predictions being reliable indications of confirmation of theories, how do you justify, “Testing predictions is not “just one element,” it is the most important one[?]”
Those theories were modified based on the data acquired from testing their predictions. We don’t stop. It is an iterative process.
What is so hard for you to understand about that?
Why do you portray scientists as discussing instead of working?
There’s nothing whatsoever in that quote about “theoretical aspects of theories,” or " how predictions can be shown to be mediocre means of confirming the theoretical aspects of a theory," or “past accepted theories of which the theoretical aspects have been quite significantly overturned by new theories.” Theories are overturned by data, not new theories. Those data come from testing empirical predictions, not discussion.
Yes, because testing predictions is an endless process and was the reason why those theories were modified.
Do you have an alternative?
They don’t seem to indicate that at all. You have a fundamental misunderstanding of the basis of science.
Because all of those changes in theory came about from testing of predictions!
What do you claim is more important than testing predictions?
Jim, how do LCDs work if we have made no significant progress in understanding QM?
OK. I don’t have a problem with that. But would you agree that there are different components of a theory, i.e., explanation: inferences, conclusions; and data: observations, formulas, etc?
How does iteration explain why predictions made from false theories can be accurate?
Isn’t it the data that is gathered from a prediction that’s doing the work, and not the predictions themselves?
Couldn’t it be that the predictions themselves don’t provide confirmation per se, but precisely the data that’s derived from them?
And usually a prediction, though based on theories or components thereof, in the end is just the perceptions or intuitions from such of the scientist making the prediction, isn’t it?
If so, could it be that predictions are important simply as a tool for discovery of new data?
You are profoundly misunderstanding the nature of science. I suggest that you stop focusing on terminology and start focusing on process.
No, observations and formulas are not components of theories. Observations either are consistent with or inconsistent with a theory. Formulas are descriptions.
And there’s no such thing as “theoretical aspects of theories.” That’s gibberish.
It doesn’t. It explains why we don’t quit and do pseudoscience, as you are advising us to do from your position of ignorance. As I wrote:
The predictions direct which data we acquire, so they do a lot of work. We rarely go around looking willy-nilly.
Um…yes. I’ve been trying to explain that.
NO. You’ve already made this false claim, and I’ve already explained why it is false:
If we don’t agree, we need to make our hypotheses more specific and mechanistic.
Why are you simply reiterating this false claim and not engaging with my explanation, Jim? That behavior creates a strong impression of insincerity.
It’s not, so it isn’t. Instead of reading political essays, learn some science.
You really don’t get it. If you want me to discuss further, you need to stop merely repeating your false claims.
OK. So a theory is basically the inferences or conclusions drawn from data, and the formulas describe what’s being inferred?
OK. So I’m concerned with the explanation. So I take it you don’t have an explanation then?
So they do the directing.
OK. So it’s the data from predictions that drives confirmation of a theory.
OK. So that would mean predictions need to be accepted intersubjectively among the scientific community, otherwise the hypothesis would need adjustments, right?
OK. Thanks for your patience. Now, back to my other question. Can it be demonstrated of P if E results in D whether such would be the case only if H is true?
No, but it doesn’t matter, because we’re not testing any hypothesis only once. If a different hypothesis predicts D, we just drill down, making the competing hypotheses more specific, until they predict different observations.
This is extremely common in modern biology. I strongly advise you to look into a subject that doesn’t threaten any of your beliefs.
OK. But from our discussion it seems like the best that can be said about accurate novel predictions is that they provide a measured amount of additional support for the hypothesis not being false based on the weight of whatever new data is gathered.
But it still looks to me like the data is what is really doing the heavy lifting, whether gathered cumulatively via predictions, or from any other relevant research.
And it still seems like prediction at it’s core is simply a method of generating ideas for ways in which new relevant data can be gathered for evaluating an hypothesis, similar to how an hypothesis is a tool for generating ideas for how to explain a particular phenomenon.
You have completely refused to address the iterative nature of such predictions. That’s very telling.
But it’s obvious to me that you aren’t looking carefully if you think that:
As Patrick asked, if there’s no theory or consensus for QM, how does the screen from which you are reading these words work?
Nope. It’s the essence of science. You are engaging (perhaps unwittingly) in a profoundly pseudoscientific misrepresentation of science as a retrospective, not a prospective, process. This is what pseudoscientists do to justify their refusal to test their own hypotheses.
I’m a little puzzled here. Are you talking about the general iterative process involved in the scientific method, or an iterative process specific to predictions?
I think there’s just a misunderstanding of what I’m trying to say. Maybe this will help.
An interpretation of quantum mechanics is an attempt to explain how the mathematical theory of quantum mechanics “corresponds” to reality. Although quantum mechanics has held up to rigorous and extremely precise tests in an extraordinarily broad range of experiments (not one prediction from quantum mechanics is found to be contradicted by experiments), there exist a number of contending schools of thought over their interpretation. These views on interpretation differ on such fundamental questions as whether quantum mechanics is deterministic or random, which elements of quantum mechanics can be considered “real”, and what is the nature of measurement, among other matters.
Despite nearly a century of debate and experiment, no consensus has been reached amongst physicists and philosophers of physics concerning which interpretation best “represents” reality.
Are you saying that without prediction science can no longer function? If that’s the case, how do you arrive at that conclusion?
I think that you are not saying what you think you’re saying.
You wrote:
You quoted:
That’s not even remotely close to a statement that “scientists have made no significant progress in coming up with a theory for QM that can be agreed upon,” Jim! It explicitly states that that there is a theory that has held up!
I’m sorry, but I find your writing to be hopelessly garbled and not corresponding to reality. You’re clearly only seeing what you want to see. That’s why you’re focused on twisting hearsay instead of learning from actual examples.
OK. I see your point now. What I should have said is that there has been no consensus on how to interpret quantum theory.
And I think this may highlight where some confusion may be coming in. I can’t think of any place where I would question what has been objectively, i.e. empirically, established. So to be clear regarding quantum theory, it’s only the subjective interpretation that I’m contending with.
And the same would be for the objective, i.e. empirical data of any theory based on IBE. For the most part it’s the subjective correlation of data to theory and underlying assumptions that I would have contentions with.
I think the problem is that it’s easy to confuse the objective and the subjective aspects when having a discussion about theories because of things like misunderstandings over definitions, etc.
So whenever I seem to be calling into question something that is objectively established, i.e. empirical in nature, it’s most likely I’ve done something like misused a term or misunderstood how something is defined, etc. Does that help to straighten that particular issue out?
So getting back to predictions, to my understanding, unless it can be shown that there is no other available option, i.e., it is deductive, a prediction is a subjective intuition of what could be the case if a theory is correct.
The data it predicts is empirical in nature, but the intuition itself is not. And it’s been shown possible that even though the predicted data may be revealed, it doesn’t necessarily confirm that the theory is true since it could be a mistaken correlation of the intuition with the theory in the first place.
Now I’m still not clear what you meant by prediction being the essence of science, but maybe you could elaborate on that?
But that’s not at all what you said. So why SHOULD you have said that?
It appears to me that you are just attacking science with any rhetorical cudgel you think you might have.
But you’ve repeatedly demonstrated that you have no interest in examples. You’re all rhetoric.
Wrong. Predictions are objective in that the hypothesis (all theories are hypotheses) is sufficiently MECHANISTICALLY specified so that all agree on them.
Let’s use a real-world example: are you really so stubborn as to claim that the prion hypothesis’s prediction that DNase and RNase would not eradicate prion infectivity is merely subjective?
No, it’s because there are different hypotheses that make the same prediction.
I already did, Jim, and you are very rudely ignoring my elaboration. Testing of predictions is the essence of science.
I’m done. You’re relentlessly focused on twisting hearsay instead of learning from actual examples.
Not sure what’s meant by this or what’s being asked here. But what I’m trying to tease out is how subjective aspects of a scientific theory are philosophical in nature and shouldn’t be connected, in a way that implies objectivity, with the objective empirical components of a theory. Whether or not the empirical components of a theory may be settled doesn’t necessarily mean that the subjective aspects like assumptions, interpretations, and inferences are.
And my intentions are not to attack science, but simply to have more clarity in my own mind of what’s actually empirically established science and what elements are more subjective and open to discussion and differences of opinion. Is there any problem with that?
If I am it’s not intentional. My intentions are to point out what seems to me to be subjective aspects in a scientific theory being confused as objective in nature by virtue of empirical components of the same theory, or evidences, that are objective in nature. I think the examples I brought up are relevant. Maybe you could explain to me why you think what I’ve brought up is just rhetoric.
I’m having a hard time following what’s being said here. First, is this saying making predictions is an objective endeavor? If so, maybe we have a different definition of objective. How do you define it?
And whether or not all agree on the mechanistic aspects of an hypothesis, how does that translate into the formulating of a prediction being objective? Of course, if the mechanistic aspects of a theory can be empirically verified then they can be said to be objective. But I don’t see how that makes a prediction per se objective.
I’m not at all familiar with what’s being talked about here. But if it can be empirically verified then generally it would be objective, as far as I know. Just to clarify, if it is subjective that doesn’t mean it’s not real.
A headache is something that is subjective. But if the person is not making it up then it’s real. And it’s real to the individual, but collectively it’s just not as certain to be real as something that is objective since it’s possible the person is just pretending to have a headache.
This is also a bit puzzling for me. How does that cast doubt on whether or not making a prediction is by nature subjective?
I don’t want to get sidetracked too much with talking about prediction as it’s not really my main concern. But I’m still not real clear on what you’re saying here. I have no problems with saying making predictions are important for generating ideas for ways to uncover novel data.
However, if by testing predictions you’re referring to the actual gathering of data, then I would at least agree that gathering data is possibly the essence of science, or at least a core element of it.
But from what I can gather scientific research is not solely prediction dependent. So I think testing, i.e., gathering of data, in whatever form it takes could maybe be said to be the essence, or possibly a core element of science.
So if it’s qualified as, “gathering data, of which testing predictions is a part, is the essence,or at least a core element of science,” then I think I could agree with that.
Actually I see a few more possibilities with prediction that I hadn’t thought about. From what I understand, in an objective situation an hypothesis has empirically verifiable mechanistic components from which empirically verifiable predictions involving deductive reasoning can be made. Predicting eclipses would be an example of this.
However, it seems to me for hypothesis concerning past events that aren’t reoccurring or reproducible, empirical elements are missing, and therefor they move more into being subjective in nature and relying on abductive reasoning.
And it doesn’t seem like scientific predictions in the strict sense of predicting a future event would be possible in such a case. But what I think would be more precisely described as an expectation of some particular data would probably be used when possible to test for their validity.
Your whole notion of empirical vs. subjective “aspects” of a theory makes no sense.
Then you should engage with the clear, real-life examples I’ve offered. You’ve just ignored them because they don’t suit your purpose.
The problem is that you falsely accused me of misunderstanding you, when you didn’t understand what you offered as an example. I’ve offered you better examples, but you ignore them.
But you completely misunderstood the example YOU chose, while falsely accusing me of misunderstanding you.
What do you think of the examples I brought up?
Perhaps you should consider an example.
No, advancing hypotheses is. You’re falsely personalizing it, as one who wants to attack and devalue science would be expected to do. The hypothesis makes the predictions, not the person.
I don’t agree with your ideas about “aspects” in general.
It would help if you made an effort to become familiar with it.
That makes no sense.
We’re not talking about headaches. I’m talking about the prion hypothesis (now a theory), and you are blowing it off.
Real-world examples would help. The hypothesis that you are just rhetorically attacking science because of evolution predicts that you will avoid them.
You don’t understand. A scientific hypothesis does not need to have any “empirically verifiable” mechanistic components. It simply needs to be mechanistic.
And that is a false creationist trope. The predictions only have to predict something that you currently don’t know.
Do you deny that hypothesis testing is useless in the cases of murder investigation or auto mechanics because the event being studied occurred in the past?
It may be due to a difference between us in how a theory is viewed. I believe the example I brought up of QM is relevant here. The mechanics of the theory have so far never failed empirical verification and therefore can be deemed as objective, unless and until new data shows otherwise.
Yet the interpretation is obviously subjective considering, among other things, that no consensus of opinion has been reached on it after 100 years of debate.
However, it’s not clear to me if you consider the interpretation as part of the theory? If not, and you consider a theory as only the mechanics, I would have to reformulate the explanation to fit that understanding of a theory. (See the next comment.)
OK. As seems evident in the case of QM, there is a difference between the mechanics of a theory and the interpretation of the theory. But maybe you don’t consider the interpretation as part of the theory?
If that’s the case, then I would reformulate what I’ve said by saying that the theory can be either objective or subjective depending on if it’s empirically verifiable or not. And the interpretation, what the world must be like in light of the truth of the theory, can be objective or subjective also depending on if it’s empirically verifiable or not.
I didn’t “accuse” you of misunderstanding. I simply suggested it as a possibility. There is a difference, at least in my mind. And I would assume you’re not implying that it’s not possible for you to misunderstand something at some point in any given discussion, right?
Anyhow, the way I see it, this was just a simple mistake of not being clear on my part, and I don’t see it as something that needs to be made into more of an issue than is necessary.
I would say that’s not an accurate representation of what happened. Nonetheless, now that it’s hopefully cleared up, I think it might be helpful if there was some interaction with the particular content of what I wrote that was unfortunately completely side-stepped in the process due to the focus on the lack of clarity on my part.
I have a hard time grasping the coherence of this statement. As far as I can tell, hypothesis are abstract and cannot “do” anything. I would say that it’s scientists that formulate predictions by reasoning from the framework of a particular hypothesis. If scientists aren’t involved, there would be no predictions, nor any hypotheses from which to make the predictions, nor would science as a discipline exist at all.
Were my previous comments above at all helpful to clarify things in this regard?
Examples, as in more than one? The prion is the only one that I’m aware of. Did I miss something?
The reason I didn’t give a more substantive response before is that I didn’t find anything in my previous online search that provided any pertinent info. However, later I found this:
These breakthroughs have proven that a misfolded protein is the active component of the infectious agent and that the propagation of the disease and its unique features depends on the self-replication of the infectious folding of the prion protein. In spite of these important discoveries, it remains unclear whether another molecule besides the misfolded prion protein might be an essential element of the infectious agent. Future research promises to reveal many more intriguing features about the rogue prions.
So from what I can gather, providing the article is reliable, which it seems to be, it seems it’s been objectively demonstrated in experiments, at least according to the article, that the prion protein is, if not the only one, at least one of the main active components in the disease. However, it seems it still remains a subjective proposal as to whether or not there is another molecule involved as an essential element in the disease.
But as to your question:
I assume you’re getting back to the question of whether or not a prediction is subjective. Maybe I should define what I mean by objective/subjective to avoid any unnecessary confusion. I’m using these terms narrowly in a philosophical sense to mean internal to (subjective) or external to (objective) a person.
As far as I know, a scientific prediction is typically a proposition about external material reality. The predicted external truth is investigated by direct observation, and/or experimentation to make a determination.
Now as I believe I already mentioned elsewhere, what is being predicted about external reality by a prediction wouldn’t determine the nature of prediction itself. What determines its nature is whether or not the prediction itself is internally or externally realized.
And as far as I can tell, a prediction is an internal exercise in reason by a person attempting to formulate what would be expected in external material reality if the mechanism of an hypothesis were true.
I don’t think that could be called objective (used as I’m defining it), since it all takes place internally. It’s basically a thought process. And thought processes are internal processes. You do agree that thoughts are subjective (based on the definition I’m using), right?
So since the prediction itself, like any other abstract proposition, isn’t an external material reality and hence is not subject to external empirical examination, it would, therefor, always be subjective.
It makes perfect sense to me. Maybe if you could give me an idea of why you think it doesn’t make sense I could possibly understand where you’re coming from?
As far as I can tell it’s pertinent to the point I was making, which I consider to be relevant to what was being discussed.
(Addressed this in previous comment up above.)
How about eclipses, or planetary orbits? They’re a bit more familiar as topics and might be a little more practical as examples to examine.
I have no problem with that. However, in order to be “objective” I believe they need to be empirically verifiable. If they aren’t, then they are subjective and would generally be regarded as less certain, and depending on the degree of uncertainty, more open to differing opinions.
OK. So that definition would include prediction of future events, like an eclipse–which is a more narrow definition of prediction–and prediction of novel data, otherwise expressed as novel data that would be expected if the hypothesis were true, right?
Regardless, I would say that the former sense of prediction is more commonly derived from mechanisms where there are instances that can be directly studied and confirmed using real time reoccurring empirical events.
Whereas the latter sense, I believe, is more commonly derived from mechanisms that are specifically concerned with past events that don’t occur in their entirety in the present so that there are no complete instances available in real time events from which they can be directly studied and confirmed.
Not at all. The way I understand it, investigations, both criminal and for mechanical failure, just like any that concern past event, usually use IBE in one form or another. In all fields, including science, that’s when IBE is commonly used, for determining the best explanation (hypothesis) of events that happened in the past.
Generally, because of the inability to go back in the past and observe the event, there’s almost always a degree of subjectivity. Alternatively, the way I understand it, with empirical scientific studies that are concerned in their entirety with real time events and objects, hypotheses are confirmed empirically through use of deduction. In those cases they would be said to be objective.