Other ways of knowing?

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I don’t quite understand. We’ve established that:

  1. You seem to agree that there is no way to conclusively show (using science or any other method) to a colorblind person that “redness” as a conscious experience exists,
  2. You regard the fact that redness exists as knowledge, presumably because of what your sense of color tells you.
  3. Previously, you objected to my characterization of the sensus divinatis (SD) by saying that I cannot convince you that it exists or is working properly, either by science or any other agreed upon method of knowing.
  4. From 1 and 2, it is shown that objection 3 is defeated, since we have now established that if God exists and I perceive him using SD (a faculty that you don’t have), I don’t need to prove to you that my SD exists and is working properly in order to use it, similar to how I don’t need to prove to the obstinate colorblind person that my sense of color is working properly to be able to use it.
  5. Thus, by your criteria, using my SD, I can call my belief in the existence of God as justified.
  6. My belief in the existence of God is justified true belief, which thus counts as knowledge.

(Note that I’m using the JTB account of knowledge, even though it has its problems, just for the sake of simplification.)

EDIT: To expand on 4, we can call the belief that one’s faculties are functioning properly as a properly basic belief. You don’t need additional justification for your properly basic beliefs.

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