Spoke to Kent Hovind!

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I should have said “reliable knowledge of the world”. Let’s look at your list. We can of course produce reliable knowledge of formal systems by manipulating the formal systems, but that’s not knowledge of the world. Math is a formal system; one could argue that morality is too, to the extent that it comes out of reasoning from first principles rather than observation. I would claim that historical study, to the extent that it produces reliable knowledge, is based on the scientific method. “I made a cup of tea to make you happy” isn’t reliable knowledge, nor is the greatness of Beethoven. And nobody said that science explains everything, only that there is no other source of reliable knowledge.

The fault lies in those who believe in objective morality. That’s what “instincts” means. Or are you asking why we should obey our instincts?

Wouldn’t that creationist be correct?

That seems like a completely different way. Please don’t descend into solipsism. It’s irrelevant to the question.

What exactly do you mean by “makes much more sense”?

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I don’t understand why “of the world” is relevant here. When I say that “science doesn’t explain everything” I mean more than just things that are contingently true in this world.

What constitutes reliable knowledge for you? I don’t think we’ve defined that yet.

These two statements of yours seem to be contradictory. Do you or do you not believe that science is capable (in principle) of explaining everything?

Yep, I’m saying that there are plenty of people who intuitively think that morality is objective, even if they also know that moral instincts could have been the products of evolutionary forces.

It’s not irrelevant. The point is that there are foundational truths that are not easily proven or disproven. It’s up to the individual to choose. Whether the success of science needs an explanation is one of them.

I mean it on two levels. On the intellectual level, a theistic worldview is better able to explain the existence of the universe and its governing laws, consciousness, morality, human nature, and religion. On a personal level, accepting that Creator God exists and submitting my life to him has resulted in greater personal satisfaction and flourishing than when I did not do so.

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Since Science can’t yet explain the complexity and order of life; God must have designed it to be this way?

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And I don’t understand what “are contingently true in this world” is for either. I was trying to refer to knowledge that exists outside our heads, so as to exclude mathematics and matters of subjective opinion.

That’s a hard question. I mean knowledge that we have good reason to suppose is true. Of course that just pushes the question off to what “good reason” means.

The absence of contradiction lies in the difference between “everything” and “everything that’s capable of explanation”.

I don’t see that as similar to what I asked about. Anyway, why should we believe that the people who believe in objective morality are right? Is intuition a way to reliable knowledge?

Is that your intuitive belief, or can you support it, perhaps with science?

Can we agree that’s not a valid reason for thinking that God exists?

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What I’m saying is that both you and I accept certain propositions as objectively true solely through intuition, logical reasoning, and/or basic sense data instead of the methods of empirical science.

Some of these propositions are only contingently true in this world, meaning that you can imagine another world where it is not true (e.g. “Other minds exist besides my own” - I can imagine a world where I am literally the only mind existing).

Some other propositions are necessarily true, meaning you cannot imagine a world where they are not true (e.g. mathematical theorems such as “for any finite group G, the order of every subgroup H of G divides the order of G.”).

These facts are proof that the methods of science alone are insufficient to account for all the knowledge we hold.

Now, you’ve basically replied that non-scientific knowledge is not reliable knowledge. However, you’ve also conceded that you don’t have a rigorous definition of what reliable knowledge is. Without such a definition, it’s going to be difficult for us to come to terms on anything. (It’s also kind of ironic, because that means you’ve been using the term “reliable knowledge” in an intuitive manner during this conversation, when at the same time you’ve been criticizing intuition as a way of knowing. :wink: )

Now on to the secondary matters…

I don’t know if you can ask for further justification for people who believe morality is objective. Most people end up behaving as if they do. Do you not think that say, the 9/11 attacks were objectively morally wrong?

I can support it with argumentation, some of which is philosophical, some scientific. However, most of the things I mentioned have not traditionally been the purview of science anyway.

It’s certainly not a reason I would bring to a formal academic debate, but we hold beliefs not for strictly rational reasons, am I correct? (Of course, this is not to say that Christianity is irrational. Just that my belief in it is not reducible to a mere act of rational assent.)

Just to drive the point home again, on what rational basis do you hold the belief that other minds exist?

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Which is more than most of the people who claim to take the Bible literally have bothered to do. :sunglasses:

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I would say that logical reasoning and basic sense data are among the methods of empirical science, though intuition is not. Intuition is a poor guide to reality, and I try not to accept anything by intuition.

No problem as long as you don’t imagine that it’s true.

I would claim that mathematical theorems are “true” in quite a different way from empirical facts, and not because the facts are contingent. Theorems are merely implications of certain imagined assumptions. Unless you’re a Platonist, they don’t exist in the same way that real objects exist.

Are they? “There are other minds” can be investigated scientifically using empirical data. And group theory is knowledge in a quite different sense from the one I’m trying to discuss.

…about the world. Actually, I thought my definition was good enough for current purposes. Do you accept intuition as a way of knowing? But it seems to go wrong so often; not an encouraging property.

No, I don’t, because I don’t think morality is objective. Morality is a human construct. Some moral rules make it more pleasant to live within human society than others. “Thou shalt not kill” is one such. Do you believe in objective morality? If so, what is its source? If that source is God, how do you deal with the Euthyphro dilemma?

Such as?

Perhaps, but one shouldn’t be proud of it. The question is whether there’s another way of knowing. I would claim that “has resulted in greater personal satisfaction” is not such a way. You?

Well, of course my intuition runs that way, but intuition isn’t a reliable guide. If I subject the matter to investigation, it’s certainly a simpler explanation for the observed phenomena. For example, that I see other people who act as though they have minds. Well, some of them do; not so sure about some of the voters in Michigan. Could I conceivably be a brain in a vat? Sure. But it’s quite an elaborate explanation of the data, much more so than that there actually is a reality. Science, of course, doesn’t deal in proof; that’s not how reliable knowledge works. Anyway, in this case intuition and science coincide.

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First, if you count logical reasoning as part of empirical science, then intuition surely is also part of it. Intuition is a crucial component of deciding which experiments to do and developing new theories. For example, much of particle physics is based on fundamental guiding principles such as naturalness which is not verifiable. An experienced physicist is often able to know intuitively whether a proposed experiment is feasible or not. Intuition is not just blind guessing; it is an instinct built over years of experience in the field.

Secondly, you are falling into the common tautological trap of labeling all reliable means of knowing into “empirical science.” Of course, physics and chemistry have commonalities with mathematics, social science, history, and philosophy. But that doesn’t necessarily mean that historians are acting as scientists whenever they deduce that, say, the Roman Empire existed. Once you start doing this, the notion of empirical science becomes meaningless. We might as well say that theological and philosophical reasoning is also part of empirical science.

You’re conflating the mind-independent existence of propositions with their truth. You do not need to be a mathematical Platonist to accept that the proposition

a) For any finite group G, the order of every subgroup H of G divides the order of G.

is necessarily true, and this is not dependent on any additional assumptions. What I’m saying here is not a theistic view of mathematics - this is just standard, basic logic and mathematics!

In one case you are positing the existence of many independent minds, whereas in the other you are positing only one mind existing, namely your own. One could argue that the latter, solipsistic option is obviously much simpler, as it has less entities existing.

Note that you’re also assuming that

b) If theory A and theory B are mutually exclusive and both explain the evidence equally well, and theory A is more “elaborate”, then theory B is true and theory A is false.

On what rational, non-circular basis do you regard proposition b) is true?

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This is an interesting discussion, and not related to Kent Hovind. Perhaps @moderators might consider splitting it off to a separate topic.

I agree with some of what @John_Harshman says, but I disagree with other parts. And I could say about the same regarding @dga471 .

Here, I will agree with @John_Harshman . For sure, scientists depend on their intuition. But I don’t see how we could include intuition among the methods of science. I would include the judgment of working scientists as part of the methods. And that implicitly depends on their intuition. But personal intuition is private, so I don’t see how it could be explicitly included in science.

Yes, I agree with that criticism. I see history and journalism as quite clearly distinct from science, although they also are empirical.

I don’t think that was what @John_Harshman was suggesting. I see him as making a distinction between truth as used in mathematics, and truth as used in ordinary every day life. From my way of looking at it, mathematical truth is very technical and formal, while truth in ordinary life often extends beyond that. For example in ordinary life and in science, people are likely to say that heliocentrism is true and geocentrism is false. But to say this goes beyond the technical and formal ways that we use to assess mathematical truth.

This nicely illustrates the distinction that I am making. In terms of what I am describing as technical and formal, there is no basis for saying that (b) is true. However, we often do reach conclusions about truth in that way. However, I think we cannot do that individually - we need the support of others. So it becomes a matter of truth by pragmatic social convention.

In this sense, I say that heliocentrism is neither true nor false in the technical formal sense. But we accept it as true on the basis of pragmatic social convention.

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Most definitely!

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Surely not. The source of hypotheses is not quite part of science. Yet logical reasoning from data is essential.

Nevertheless, it isn’t a way of knowing. It must be confirmed by actual reasoning from data before a hypothesis can be accepted. You won’t find “I just know” in any scientific paper.

History can however be done as science. It’s based on reasoning from evidence. Is archaeology a science?

If it involved reasoning from empirical data it would be. But it doesn’t, does it? Nor is mathematics a science.

Of course it is. It depends on the axioms of mathematics and is just an implication of those axioms. All mathematics is the working out of the implications of axioms. Some of those axioms are modeled after observations of the real world, but that doesn’t make theorems into truths about the world.

That’s a misunderstanding of the principle of parsimony. I presume you don’t intend to argue that and don’t really believe it’s a reasonable argument.

Because it seems to work well as a procedure. It makes data easier to interpret and it seldom leads to inconsistencies.

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I think our problem is that neither of us has agree on a rigorous definition of what constitutes the “empirical methods of science.” In any case, I think the discussion of intuition is a red herring for the main issue. I’m not even sure at this point if intuition (in the approximate way we have been using word) is used in theology and philosophy at all, by your standards.

So, reasoning from evidence is science…well then in that case everything is science.

I would not regard archaeology as a purely empirical science. There are certainly parts of it which are more scientific (e.g. dating layers of ruins), but there is also figuring out how your findings intersect with what is already known about the history, culture, and language of the region.

I’m not so sure. The principle of parsimony, in my experience, isn’t really used in a rigorously defined manner in science, most of the time. (IMHO, it is used more “intuitively”, and in combination with other non-rational principles such as elegance and beauty.) It could be interesting for you to explain why you think parsimony rules out solipsism.

OK, but do you agree that none of that strictly implies that that principle is true? Just because something is useful, or easier to think about, doesn’t mean it’s true.

It’s important to remember that I’m not ultimately arguing the principle of parsimony is false; I’m just saying that we don’t hold it for scientific reasons, in the sense that no one ever designed an experiment to test the reality of the principle of parsimony. Rather, it’s an overarching principle of science which is commonly accepted for practical reasons, and found to be fruitful.

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Then why did you bring it up?

Sorry, no. Mathematics doesn’t reason from evidence. I don’t think either philosophy or theology involve much reasoning from evidence. There’s plenty that isn’t science. And a lot of historical writing isn’t reasoning from evidence either. But some of it is.

Why do you rule out solipsism?

True. It’s a heuristic. If you’re looking for proof, you need to avoid science.

One need not design an experiment, there being a natural experiment in the wealth of observations that it makes science work.

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If you trace back where it was brought up, it was in the context of whether people are justified in their intuition that morality is objective. I’m not sure if that’s the same kind of intuition as that which scientists like to use, strictly speaking. However, we don’t need to use moral truths as an example of non-empirical knowledge; as I said, there are many forms of such knowledge.

Great, so we agree that mathematics is not an empirical science. Now, I would like to argue that mathematical knowledge exists, so as to prove my point that empirical science doesn’t account for all knowledge. To come back to your earlier point about mathematics:

Yes, mathematics does not discover truths about the world, which would be contingent truths. It discovers necessary truths in the form of

Given certain axioms C and the rules of logic, statements S1, S2, etc. are true

Because mathematical truths are true and justified, they can constitute knowledge (using the conventional account of knowledge as justified true belief).

I can’t. I regard solipsism as false as a basic, non-rational belief. It’s a choice I make, similar to my choice with regards to certain theistic convictions. Another similar non-rational belief is the belief that my rational faculties are working properly - that I’m not being insane and unable to reason properly.

I’m saying more than just that we have no strict proof that parsimony is true. I’m saying there is nothing which rationally justifies us in concluding that parsimony is even likely to be true. There is no guarantee that what is true is simpler. That is all a huge assumption.

Similarly, the belief that science has been successful means it likely gives us true knowledge of the world is also an assumption which is non-scientific. It’s meta-scientific.

I don’t disagree with you that it makes science work. I’m just saying that it’s not a scientific conclusion in the same way that “the mass of the electron is 10^{-31} kg” is. It’s a meta-scientific principle.

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To expand on this point further - you might be able to argue that the success of science means that assuming the epistemological structure that makes science possible (which includes the principle of parsimony) gives us more consistent true statements within that system compared to other epistemological structures, and that this means the epistemological structure of science is rationally superior in some way. But notice that this is an argumentation based on pure logic, nothing empirical. We have crossed from science into philosophy of science.

This is all what I’ve been saying all along. I’m not denying the power of empirical observation. After all, I’m a scientist myself. I’m just saying that we regularly engage in more than just empirical observation.

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Neither of these counts as knowledge, right?

Of course there’s no guarantee. That’s asking for proof again. What we have is evidence that it’s a heuristic that works well.

Nevertheless it can be tested. You seem hung up on proof, rather than the scientific standard of “close enough”.

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I surely hope it does. Otherwise, everything (including scientific knowledge) I deduce from that would not necessarily count as knowledge either. If my rational faculties are not working properly, for example, that could mean that my empirical observations tell me nothing about the real world.

The question here is whether the scientific standard is justified itself. Which is why we have to turn to something other than science itself. It wouldn’t make sense to evaluate science as a whole by the standards of science, just as you wouldn’t evaluate pseudo-science by the standards of pseudo-science. Instead, you have to evaluate science by subjecting it to higher-level principles such as logic and foundational commitments. Do you understand what I’m saying?

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Can we agree that hope is not also a justification for knowledge? You seem to be arguing that assumptions count as knowledge. That doesn’t make sense to me.

It’s always possible. But I don’t think it makes sense. We can in fact evaluate Occam’s Razor by the standards of science; we observe that it works pretty well. We can evaluate solipsism by that standard, though we can never prove that it’s false. It’s just a less reasonable alternative hypothesis. I agree that we must make the foundational assumption that reason is not totally fucked, but I wouldn’t call that knowledge; assumptions, again, are not knowledge.

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What this demonstrates is that certain kind of assumptions do count as knowledge. Again, we have to be careful not to fall into the trap of semantics. It is not contingent empirical knowledge about the world, but it is “justified true belief”.

You’re also taking me too literally when I said that “I hope it’s true.” What I mean is that faced with the reality that we cannot justify empirically our assumption that solipsism is false, we accept (almost as a philosophical convention) that that assumption is justified regardless - as a “brute fact.”

I simply disagree with you, and I am finding it difficult to express my objections even more clearly than how I already have. Notice how “it works pretty well” also assumes certain standards of justification.

I think the reason you think this is because you have a very broad conception of what constitutes the “standards of science,” given that you are already pre-committed to a scientistic view of the world, where only the methods of science give us any sort of reliable knowledge.

Any other scientists (such as @swamidass, @PdotdQ) care to comment? Can you evaluate the principle of parsimony by the standards of science, given that parsimony is part of the standards of science itself?

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I swear we use “knowledge”, “justified” and “true” in completely different ways. I can’t make anything comprehensible out of that post.

I’ll give you that one. The simplest explanation for Occam’s Razor appearing to work well is that it works well. But there are other explanations: maybe we are incompetent at observation; maybe it just happened to come out that way; maybe some unknown entity is arranging our observations so as to fool us into that belief. Only Occam’s Razor can rescue our test of Occam’s Razor. So perhaps we have found another infinite regress.