«Combinatorial imaginings and hypothetical scenarios can be endlessly argued simply on the grounds that they are theoretically possible. But there is a point beyond which arguing the plausibility of an absurdly low probability becomes operationally counterproductive»
When hypotheses require probabilistic resources that exceed Universal Plausibility Metrics, Dr. Abel argues that they ―should be considered not only operationally falsified hypotheses but bad metaphysics on a plane equivalent to blind faith and superstition. He then rigorously calculates the Universal Plausibility Metric (UPM), incorporating the maximum probabilistic resources available for the universe, galaxy, solar system, and the earth: and notes that
the Universal Plausibility Principle (UPP) states that «definitive operational falsification» of any chance hypothesis is provided by inequalities based on the probabilistic resources of the Earth (p < 1/10^-102), solar system (p < 1/10^-117), galaxy (p < 1/10^-127), Observable universe (p<1/10^-140)
@Edgar_Tamarian, you are finding out that the argument you are pointing to you, at least as you present it, relies on a fallacy. You’ve just seen a clear example of something that shows its reasoning is wrong:
If the upper bound is 1 in 10^140 then dealing out playing cards should be impossible.
If you shuffle a deck and lay out the cards one by one, the odds of that specific outcome are 1 in 52!, or 1 in 8x10^67. The total probability of the order of 3 such hands is 1 in 5x10^203. According to Dr. Abel, I shouldn’t be able to shuffle a deck of cards and lay them out one by one more than 1 or 2 times. That seems a bit ridiculous.
If you show someone a deck of cards and ask them to pick one, the event “pick a card, any card” has an associated probability. Do you agree? You might say it is inevitable that they will pick a card. That event will have a probability of 1.
It is not however, inevitable that they will pick the trey of diamonds. And that event has a different probability. Do you also agree with that? You might say that it is improbable that they will pick the trey of diamonds.
Totally disagree, at least in case of biology, we have to find not just randomness, but specificity, that is the work of Douglas Axe, I will not cite, you know better than me, which paper I am pointing to. But in general, if you need to win not just any ticket, but a specific ticket on which we marked before circulation, then my point works, it is the same case for biology,
That is a change of topic, a different question. If you can’t follow the basics, don’t make it more complex. He is correctly explaining an important and non-intuitive fact about probabilities. Do not change the subject.
In my example, there were two events. E1: Pick any card. And E2: pick this specific card (trey of diamonds). Are you saying that those are not events or that they are the same event? Are you saying that they have the same probability associated with them?
Let’s assume that T_aquaticus and Joshua are referring to the lottery example.
Can we have the lottery consist of only 52 lottery tickets, and can we have 52 possible winners of the lottery, each with an equal chance of winning, and can we give each potential winner of the lottery a name that corresponds to one of the cards in a deck of cards? E.g, one entrant would be named “trey of diamonds” and a second entrant would be named “nine of clubs.” Has anything substantially changed in our doing so?
This seems to be a great Berkleyan example of the fallacy of abstraction. Mathematically, one can divide a continuum infinitely, and, as you say, each outcome is zero. But that is a purely mental construct (as indeed is probability itself, but at a more empirical level). Nothing in the physical universe is infinitely divisible, and probabilities applied to reality must therefore be grounded in finite numbers.
In such a universe “0” is "never, and “1” is “always,” and the counter-intuitive “almost” goes back into the abstract world where it belongs.
As soon as the numbers are finite, then even when no actual calculation is made, some things are exceedingly likely, and others vanishingly improbable. And that corresponds to everything we learn in life.