The discussion between ID proponents and counter-proponents is what I was referring to - it has made the paper pretty famous with people who are interested in design arguments.
I didnât state that it didnât. However âthe design argumentâ had been largely moribund since the time of William Paleyâs time until the IDM dusted it off when they launched their movement, with expolcitly anti-evolution polemics such as Evolution: A Theory in Crisis and Darwin on Trial.
No it merely âneed[s]â for the acceptance of ID arguments that are regarded as discredited by the scientific community.
Your argument for your âconjunctive explanationâ relies on the insufficiency of evolution alone.
For this purported insufficiency you rely on IDâs discredited arguments.
Therefore without those discredited arguments, your own argument folds like a house of cards.
Then you clearly werenât reading what I had written:
A quick look at your bookâs table of contents would reveal your entire Section 4.2 as an obvious example (subsections being âThe Conservation of Informationâ, âIrreducible Complexityâ and âProtein Evolutionâ, for those who donât have it to hand).
Given that you failed to explicate your argument in your âPS articleâ, but instead directed us to Glass for it, then yes it almost certainly was going to come up.
The fact that you are claiming that âbiologists increasingly talk ofâ something, when no biologist here seems to have any idea of what you are talking about, is problematical in the extreme.
I will note that you have failed to answer my question:
If you cannot even explain what it is that âbiologists increasingly talk ofâ to a biologist, then I would suggest that your entire âLaws of Form and Convergenceâ section likewise collapses like a house of cards.
I find this to be a problematic argument. A reductio ad absurdum relies on showing that the opposite scenario leads to absurdity or contradiction. This is not clear here.
Firstly, your claimed âabsurdityâ itself relies upon an absurd hypothetical.
Secondly, your hypothetical does not in fact rule out non-divine explanations, such as a hallucination, or a very high-tech trickster â so it fails to demonstrate that that, even if we accept your absurd hypothetical, the result is an absurdity.
Finally, even if we accept it is an absurdity, this would only require a minor alteration to the contention:
⌠to read:
God explains anything equally well and equally poorly, except for something that only the existence of God could possibly explain (acknowledging that it may be impossible to specify such a thing, even hypothetically).
It is however unclear that this caveat has any real world implications, so it can probably be omitted for the purpose of brevity.
Addendum:
On further reflection, it occurs to me that a tighter formulation might be:
An explanation that explains anything equally well is inferior to any other possible explanation. (With the corollary that the explains-anything explanation should only be accepted if all other explanations are irrefutably impossible.)
This of course leaves out the possibility that you have more than one explains-everything explanation. Reformulating for this case:
All explanations that explains anything equally well is inferior to any other possible explanation. (However, if all other explanations are impossible, we are now in a quandary as to which explains-anything explanation to accept.)
I would hasten to add that both of these formulations are equivalent to @John_Harshmanâs in real life situations, the reformulation is merely to nail down avoidance of the reductio ad absurdum accusation.
Further Addendum:
On still further reflection Johnâs formulation does not in fact fall into the reductio ad absurdum trap. He does not state that an explanation that âexplains anything equally wellâ is an invalid explanation, merely a âpoorâ explanation â and you would still accept a poor explanation, by default, if it was the only possible explanation you have left. At best my reformulations merely make this (perhaps) clearer.
If you are interested in making serious a philosophical argument for âdesignâ as a concept relevant to evolution, I really donât see why you would include the ID movement as any part of the discussion, no matter how âfamousâ they might be. You might, at most, want to make a brief mention of them simply because some readers might be familiar with them, but only to make the point that they have no credibility whatsoever so you will be making no further reference to them.
I think now would be a good time to put together a summary of some points that remain unanswered in engaging with @Rope:
What are these âLaws of Formâ that âbiologists increasingly talk ofâ, without apparently knowing that they are doing so?
How does the Fine Tuning argument differ from Kojonanâs argument (simply referring us to Glass is unhelpful, as that article is sufficiently waffley as to obscure rather than elucidate the core structure of the argument)?
What part do the ID arguments have in Kojonanâs argument? Given that the scientific community rejects these arguments, any claims based upon them will not be credible to the scientific community.
What specifically is it that Kojonan is claiming is designed? Lacking any specifics, this claim can be dismissed as vacuous.
What does it mean to say that something is designed? I can design until Iâm blue in the face, but nothing actually appears until I do something causal in the world. I can design a house, but somebody has to build it. Itâs the building process that leaves evidence. So rather than âWhat did God design?â itâs really better to ask âWhat did God make?â.
Returning to Glass, I discovered this to be the only section that appears to directly address Kojonanâs argument (as opposed to waffling around it), a direct quote from Kojonanâs book:
He formulates a design argument as follows:
Premise 1. Some things in nature (or nature itself) exhibit property D (such as complexity ordered toward a purpose).
Premise 2. This property would be well explained if design was the cause. However, other explanations explain this property poorly.
Therefore, when comparing all available explanations, design is the best overall explanation of this property.
Therefore, property D was probably designed; at least this property provides more reason to infer design over competing explanations. (Kojonen 2021, 78)
The problem is that this formulation is skeletal to the point of being largely unhelpful. Points of concern are:
What âpropert[ies] Dâ, beyond the vague claim of âcomplexity ordered toward a purposeâ, are under discussion? (This is my point #4 above.)
The first statement of Premise 2 appears to be a malformed sylogism rather than a genuine premise. Even if one thing is indeed the âcauseâ of something else, it does not make the bald statement âX caused Yâ a good explanation. I could claim âI caused the fireâ. Even if my statement were true it would still be a poor explanation â as it would not explain whether I caused the fire intentionally or by accident, how I caused the fire, why (if intentional) I caused the fire, etc. (This is also covered in @John_Harshmanâs point # 5 above.)
The basis for any claim that âother explanations explain this property poorlyâ (this really should have been listed as a separate third premise). If the basis is (in whole or in substantial part) ID arguments, then the scientific community would reject this premise.
Given that the first statement in Premise 2 appears very similar to ID argumentation, âcomplexity ordered toward a purposeâ is very close to ID language, and "The Conservation of Informationâ, âIrreducible Complexityâ and âProtein Evolutionâ (that Kojonen discusses at length in his Section 4.2) appear to be the most obvious specific candidates for his âpropert[ies] Dâ and the basis for the claim that âother explanations explain [these] propert[ies] poorlyâ, it is hard to see any daylight between Kojonan and ID.
I would on this basis strongly suggest that there is good evidence for stating that Kojonan is indeed an ID advocate.
This is straight up Behe, and indicates that @Ropeâs understanding of the philosophical aspects of evolutionary theory is at about the level of @colewd. Which I suppose should make Bill happy.
The theory of evolution provides the explanation for how things with the appearance of âcomplexity ordered towards a purposeâ can arise without being designed. So he needs to provide a different example of D to save his argument.
Except to the extent that your entire book can be considered to be your âown impressionâ, you gave no indication in your book that this claim was merely your âown impressionâ rather than a demonstrable fact.
I think there is a large potential problem of Selection Bias in the âbiology literature [youâ]ve readâ, the âbiologistsâ you listen to, the âconferencesâ you attend, and the very fact that you base your âown impressionâ about what âbiologists increasingly talk aboutâ in part on âlistening to philosophersâ. I find it highly unlikely that this would be representative of what the vast majority of biologists, who are outside the ID and âScience and Religionâ echo chambers, talk about.
Regarding your four questions, I think we already have the answers:
All references by biologists to the form of any organism, ever, will do, as the term âlaws of formâ has no specific meaning as used here whatsoever.
Kojonenâs argument avoids the weaknesses of fine-tuning arguments (and the vast, yawning absence of evidence which would connect those arguments to the world) by being so vague that any deficiency of any specific fine-tuning argument, or any deficiency of the evidence supporting such an argument, can be ignored as not pertaining specifically to Kojonen.
They form the entire factual foundation of it, and if you say that ID authors are dishonest you are, as described in his doctoral thesis, a âconspiracy theorist.â If you think that peptidyl transferase is a ribozyme, well, your views are no more worthy of regard than QAnonâs. Note his silly remark that he canât trust @Mercer to be fair to Stephen Meyer.
There are no specifics. And if you call that vacuous, thatâs only because you hate philosophy. And besides, youâre engaging in philosophy when you say that, so nyah nyah.
Now, I do have a question which I cannot, for the life of me, answer. Why the hell would anyone ever bring up Kojonen and act as though there were something serious, worthwhile or interesting in it? If ID is crap, this is post-processing sludge from the sewage treatment plant. When I see stuff like this being touted as though it is the worthwhile side of the ID âargumentâ (and who the hell wants arguments, anyway, when it is evidence, not argument, which ID desperately lacks?), all it does is affirm that there can be nothing worthwhile in any of it.
A related question, prompted by the posts in the main thread: is it appropriate to say that a pseudoscientific loon has had âhis ass handed to him on a platterâ when that ass has been so sliced and diced as to be no longer recognizable as an ass? Or do we have to use some modified term like âprocessed ass food productâ?
The unfortunate thing is this discussion was not initially presented as, and did not need to become, yet another battle in the ID Culture Wars. It could have been an opportunity for someone claiming to be interested in the philosophical implications of particular scientific ideas to correct some of his misunderstandings of those ideas. It didnât work out that way, and I guess anyone who has been participating in or following the discussion can decide why that was.
Well, it could have been, if the fellow had been the slightest bit interested in actual biology. I think that as his entire position depends upon ignorance of actual biology, the chances heâd want to watch its demolition were always poor. But as long as there are ignorant people, he will have his meal ticket.