Sure, the McLean case. But the notion that this supplies âthe legal definition of scienceâ is entirely wrong. Several points:
âThe law has no power to define science, except for the purposes of any particular legal proceeding over which some court has jurisdiction. A âlegal definitionâ that was wrong would still be wrong, whether it had the force of law in some circumstance or not. Iâm surprised to see anyone on the creationist side arguing the contrary, as this point is constantly being taken up by those who are disappointed in the Kitzmiller ruling.
âThe McLean case is a decision of a United States District Court, concerning one specific enactment of a creationism law. A US District Courtâs decisions are not the last word as to what the law is in our legal system; as precedent, the ruling has advisory value only.
âThe role of the court in such a case is not to decide generically âwhat the definition of science is,â but to decide the issue at bar, which, here, was whether âcreation scienceâ was science. Accordingly, the court will focus on those particular points which the parties placed in dispute rather than upon a more general definition.
âEven as laid out by the court, this isnât a âdefinition of science.â The court did identify, as a matter of a factual finding rather than a legal ruling, five things which it deemed to be âessential characteristicsâ of science. Such a statement doesnât purport to be a 360-degree description of the whole corpus of science; it focuses, rather, as I have pointed out above, upon specific points which the parties placed in issue and upon which expert witnesses testified.
To understand a legal ruling properly and fully, you really have to understand the conventions of the common law; you have to understand the distinction between issues of fact and issues of law. And to understand what the real meaning â the forward-looking meaning â of a case is with regard to other applications of the same principles, these distinctions are very important. The manner in which a judicial decision binds issues of fact is very, very different in scope from the manner in which it binds issues of law.
Courts donât have the power to change underlying realities. A court cannot make an innocent man guilty, but it can find him guilty and execute him on account of that finding. If the Kitzmiller court had ruled that ID was science, that wouldnât make ID into science any more than its ruling that ID isnât science operates to make ID not-science. The role of a court is not to render decisions about facts which we must all, thereafter, accept and abide by, but to render decisions about some underlying dispute (e.g., âmay a school district teach ID consistent with the Establishment clause?â) by evaluating and attempting to arrive at correct decisions about facts.
So, if you want to argue that Jeansonâs work is scientific because itâs falsifiable, by all means do. But a useful resolution of that argument does not lie in the wheelhouse of a US District Court, even though in some circumstances a US District Court may be called upon to evaluate it.