Sure, the McLean case. But the notion that this supplies “the legal definition of science” is entirely wrong. Several points:
–The law has no power to define science, except for the purposes of any particular legal proceeding over which some court has jurisdiction. A “legal definition” that was wrong would still be wrong, whether it had the force of law in some circumstance or not. I’m surprised to see anyone on the creationist side arguing the contrary, as this point is constantly being taken up by those who are disappointed in the Kitzmiller ruling.
–The McLean case is a decision of a United States District Court, concerning one specific enactment of a creationism law. A US District Court’s decisions are not the last word as to what the law is in our legal system; as precedent, the ruling has advisory value only.
–The role of the court in such a case is not to decide generically “what the definition of science is,” but to decide the issue at bar, which, here, was whether “creation science” was science. Accordingly, the court will focus on those particular points which the parties placed in dispute rather than upon a more general definition.
–Even as laid out by the court, this isn’t a “definition of science.” The court did identify, as a matter of a factual finding rather than a legal ruling, five things which it deemed to be “essential characteristics” of science. Such a statement doesn’t purport to be a 360-degree description of the whole corpus of science; it focuses, rather, as I have pointed out above, upon specific points which the parties placed in issue and upon which expert witnesses testified.
To understand a legal ruling properly and fully, you really have to understand the conventions of the common law; you have to understand the distinction between issues of fact and issues of law. And to understand what the real meaning – the forward-looking meaning – of a case is with regard to other applications of the same principles, these distinctions are very important. The manner in which a judicial decision binds issues of fact is very, very different in scope from the manner in which it binds issues of law.
Courts don’t have the power to change underlying realities. A court cannot make an innocent man guilty, but it can find him guilty and execute him on account of that finding. If the Kitzmiller court had ruled that ID was science, that wouldn’t make ID into science any more than its ruling that ID isn’t science operates to make ID not-science. The role of a court is not to render decisions about facts which we must all, thereafter, accept and abide by, but to render decisions about some underlying dispute (e.g., “may a school district teach ID consistent with the Establishment clause?”) by evaluating and attempting to arrive at correct decisions about facts.
So, if you want to argue that Jeanson’s work is scientific because it’s falsifiable, by all means do. But a useful resolution of that argument does not lie in the wheelhouse of a US District Court, even though in some circumstances a US District Court may be called upon to evaluate it.