I agree, and have already conceded this in previous posts to Joshua. One might, for example, decide both that God exists, and that he is the Christian God, simultaneously.
I agree that someone might reason in this way, and probably some people have in fact reasoned in this way. But let’s do a critical analysis of such reasoning:
A. Note, as an aside, that if you employ this line of reasoning, you can’t also criticize ID folks for “God of the gaps” arguments – since your argument here is based on attributing to God something (a resurrection) you believe could never happen due to natural causes. How can you be sure that, around the corner, science won’t discover some natural way a man can come back from the dead? (Which is the argument used against ID people regarding the origin of life: “Sure, all naturalistic accounts at the moment are extremely weak and implausible, but how do you ID folks know what science will discover in the future? Maybe an account of the chemical origin of life by the sloshing around of aimless molecules will be found in 20 or 50 or 100 years. Science must not allow God of the gaps arguments, and Christian faith shouldn’t depend on them, either.”)
B. More centrally, I don’t see why “God” is put into your premise, rather than “gods” or “spirits” or “sorcerers” or “aliens with an advanced technology”. There might be more than one agent, hypothetically, capable of restoring the dead to life. Why is the jump to “God” (capital G, implying monotheism) automatic?
C. Note that in your person’s line of reason, the concept “God” is already in place. The person may not have decided whether or not God exists, and the Resurrection may be the evidence that brings about the belief, but the person already has the notion of “God” ready to apply. He intends to use that notion to make sense of the Resurrection (if there is empirical evidence for the Resurrection). So the Christian understanding of the Resurrection which the person ends up arriving at depends on the availability of the monotheistic conception of God. It remains true, then, even in the argument of such a person, that the larger concept “God” lies behind the acceptance of propositions about the divine status of Jesus. The God-concept and the Jesus-is-the-Son-of-God concept remain inseparable.
D. Wittgenstein showed long ago why this must be the case. If someone you knew had died, and a few days later showed up alive, the first thing you would do, if you were relying on your scientific instincts, would be to get a coroner’s report, find out if the person was really dead (as opposed to, say, in a rare type of coma symptomatically indistinguishable from death, etc.); you would then take notes from the person on everything he claimed had happened to him since his purported death, interview eyewitnesses who claimed to have observed him between his “death” and now, etc. You might take DNA tests or other tests to rule out the possibility that this was an impostor or a long-lost twin brother you never knew about, etc. In short, you would bend over backwards to try to find a non-supernatural explanation for the event; you would regard it your duty as a scientist to do so, before accepting that this person had been resurrected. And even if you determined the fact of resurrection, as a scientist you would be expected to treat the resurrection like any other visible phenomenon, and try to find “natural-cause only” explanations for it. So what would justify the leap to “God must have done this?” The answer, for Wittgenstein, is that people don’t derive their religion by some mechanical deduction from facts, but in fact bring their religious understanding to the facts, and use it to filter and make sense of them.
More generally, I think we are using “logically prior” in different senses. What I mean is that the claim “Jesus was God” or “Jesus was the Son of God” or “Jesus was sent by God to redeem us from our sins” or any kindred claim makes no sense except against the backdrop concept of God. That is why the concept of God is “logically prior”. I think you mean that in the order of argument one might decide first that Jesus was someone very special, and only afterward come to the firm conclusion that a God exists. I agree that this could be the order of argument. But that is not what I meant by “logically prior”. I mean that, for Jesus to be what full-blooded, orthodox Christian doctrine has always said that he is, the concept of God is logically required. No God, no Christianity. But the reverse is not true: if Christianity were proved false tomorrow (if, say, we dug up Jesus’s body), that would not prove that God does not exist. Judaism or Islam could still be true. “No God, no Christianity” is valid, but “No Christianity, no God” is not. For that reason, it is correct to say that belief in God is logically prior to beliefs connecting Jesus with God. What order of argument an individual uses to get to belief in Jesus and God is a separate matter.